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This article attempts to engage in a preliminary twinned study of the foreign policy styles of Mahathir bin Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew within the framework of 'modernizing Southeast Asian foreign policies'. Modernization is a process of immense multidimensional displacement in economy, society, political system, attitudes towards politicians, identities, work, and consumption. As such the onus falls upon their leaders to either mitigate change or productively awaken their followers to embrace a new mode of thought. Both Lee and Mahathir have however chosen to engage in the foreign policy of intellectual iconoclasm featuring the narrative of 'productive shock', manufactured nationalist logics, elitist policy-making and elaborate self-propaganda.

As great power competition escalates, secondary states may find their hedging strategies encounter greater systemic and domestic challenges. Existing literature suggests that competing great powers exert more pressure on hedgers, pushing them to choose a side. Nevertheless, in the real world, the sustainability of hedging varies across countries. In a departure from previous studies that emphasize systemic pressure, this article highlights the domestic pressure decision-makers face. It argues that the public prefers a consistent foreign policy strategy and is likely to be skeptical of hedging that contains contradictory security, economic, and political policies. Nevertheless, leaders serve as a transmission belt between systemic and domestic pressure at one end and foreign strategy at the other. Specifically, leaders with a solid support base at home enjoy greater autonomy in foreign policymaking and have a better chance of maintaining an intense hedging strategy. On the contrary, insecure leaders are more likely to cater to the public and adopt a more consistent foreign strategy, which implies the breakdown of hedging. This theoretical framework is illustrated with two cases: the China strategies of the Philippines and Singapore. © 2022, The Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), Peking University.

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The dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Batu Puteh or Pedra Branca was settled in 2008 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The decision was to give Singapore ownership over Pedra Branca, while Malaysia was given control of Middle Rocks, a small rock formation to the south of Pedra Branca. The ICJ ruling also decided that a third piece of contentious area, the Southern Ledge should be jointly managed by the two countries. This paper focuses on two aspects of the case: the decision to send the case to the ICJ, instead of utilizing regional mechanisms for dispute settlement; and the post-decision reactions of both countries. Sending the case to the ICJ shows confidence in one’s ability to win, while at the same time showing a lack of confidence in regional mechanisms for dispute settlement available to the parties regionally. Some of the lessons learnt from this process include the need to be fully prepared for the legal process; not relying solely on historical evidences; making sure that one is in effective control of the territories in dispute; and that regional mechanisms do have limitations due to perceived (un)trustworthiness of third parties, and the need to improve them further.