The notion that Singapore “punches above its weight” has become common-place. Reportedly boasting the highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the world today and projected to maintain its pole position up till 2050, Singapore’s economic success and its strategies to ensure its success have invited accusations that the city-state has continually reaped the bene ts of global governance but contributed little to it. For example, Singapore’s ostensible efforts at “leapfrogging” and transcending the ASEAN region — its “dual track” approach of negotiating multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) is the offending instance in question — have led critics to dismiss Singapore as a “free-rider” in global governance. A similar charge has been made concerning “Singaporisation,” a convenient label for critics in regard to the form of “assertive regionalism” that has purportedly been adopted by pro-independence parties in the Basque and Catalan parts of Spain. Fairly or otherwise, some Europeanists see such enthusiasm for the (as they see it) Singapore model of preferential economic regionalism as evidence of the lack of “real political responsibility” in post-crisis Europe. For that matter, what Singaporeans have long regarded as prudence in the exercise of their foreign policy, especially when o ering  nancial assistance to other countries, has elicited the occasional criticism that Singapore is insincere and overbearing. The derisive label of Singapore as an inconsequential “little red dot,” which former Indonesian president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie famously introduced in 1999, constitutes one of the most memorable examples to date. Investments made or sought after in Southeast Asia by Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund vehicles, particularly Temasek Holdings, have at times triggered nationalistic backlash from countries such asThailand regarding Singapore’s “economic imperialism”. Nor has the aspiration of its leaders to make Singapore “a first world oasis in a third world region” necessarily improved the city-state’s image among its immediate neighbours. If anything, the impression some in the region have of Singapore is that it is egotistical, conceited and uncaring. “Singapore doesn’t really care about the opinion of its neighbours,” as Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad complained in 2007, “Singapore believes the most important thing is what profits Singapore.

A common refrain in Singapore's foreign policy towards the great powers — confined to the United States (US) and China in this essay — is that it does not want to choose between them. Singapore is far from alone in articulating this strategic preference: many of its ASEAN and Asian-Pacific neighbours, including US military allies such as Australia and Thailand, have voiced similar inclinations. This essay seeks to probe a little deeper into the “not wanting to choose” discourse to make three related points. First, I argue that Singapore has already chosen; it made a choice early on — in favour of the US — soon after the British withdrawal East of Suez. Second, I suggest that that choice has served Singapore well. Third, I argue that the dilemma Singapore faces after 15 years of a very successful foreign policy (vis-à-vis the great powers) is whether to stick with America, or gravitate towards China, given the shifting power distribution in Asia. Singapore's actions in recent years suggest that it continues to strongly favour America when it comes to military security; on the economic and political-diplomatic fronts, however, it appears to be more even-handed in engaging the US and China. We conclude with an observation: the fact that Singapore is a Chinese-majority state, constrains, rather than facilitates, how far it can move towards the China bandwagon.

This essay examines Singapore's interests and role in the South China Sea in four areas: the commitment to upholding the rule of law in the relations between states, the defense of the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, the attention Singapore gives to ASEAN and the role of multilateralism in the region, and its current role as country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations.

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Purpose: In 2018, Kim Jong Un shifted his party's strategic line from parallel military and economic development to solely economic development, yet direct cooperation with South Korea, the United State: s and Japan will be difficult. This paper examines Singapore's role as venue for the Kim-Trump Summit, its history of engagement of the DPRK and prospects in the near to medium term.

Methodology: This paper reviews the literature on Singapore's unique history, political culture and exceptional economic development trajectory, as well as its relations with the DPRK and other less developed countries in the region. It then analyses North Korea's new strategic line and Kim Jong Un's use of Singapore both in outreach to the United States and towards his own citizens.

Findings: Singapore's position as neutral, friendly with all key stakeholders, including Pyongyang, combined with its history of capacity building, economic development and independence make it a unique venue. Should the decision be taken in Pyongyang to further explore economic reform, Singapore will be exceptionally useful as a platform for discussions, training, dealmaking and other exchanges. Value-This paper fits into a decade of work by the author utilizing Singapore as a platform from which to engage the DPRK at a time when Kim Jong Un and the peace process have redoubled interest in the North Korean economy and when Singapore's profile is extremely high, due to the U.S.-DPRK summit.

The year 2015 marks a significant milestone for Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is the year when Singapore celebrates its 50th anniversary as a nation. 2015 is also the year when ASEAN is supposed to have realised its vision of becoming a community after 48 years — an ASEAN Community anchored on the three pillars of economic community, socio-cultural community, and political and security community.

Singapore joined ASEAN in 1967, just two years after its independence from Malaysia in 1965. As one of five founding members of ASEAN, Singapore has been an integral part of ASEAN’s development into becoming one of the most successful regional organisations in the world. Although Singapore is the smallest state of ASEAN, it stands tall among the rest of its ASEAN neighbours having transformed itself into one of the most advanced, industrialised economies in Asia. As a city-state known to “punch above its weight”, Singapore’s contribution in shaping ASEAN’s regional agenda spanning the wide remit of socio-economic, political and security cooperation has been very significant.

At the outset, one would note that Singapore’s engagement with ASEAN as a member of this regional security organisation is closely intertwined with its own historical narrative of a post-colonial state that went through a difficult period of separation from Malaysia to now become one of its leading members. Singapore is also one of the most politically stable states in the region. Similarly, ASEAN’s history was born out of the painful post-colonial experience of enmity and amity among the newly independent states in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. After almost five decades, ASEAN has now become an established regional grouping that claims centrality in Asia’s regional security architecture.