http://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvqc6jng.10

Like Malaysia, Singapore has transformed dramatically since the 1960s, yet its politics still rest on foundations Lee Kuan Yew laid. Under his increasingly consolidated leadership, Singapore regrouped quickly after 1965. Crackdowns had largely neutralized the far left; Barisan Sosialis never recovered from 1963’s Operation Coldstore and subsequent harassment. Lee and his People’s Action Party (PAP) could now claim the added legitimacy of being founding parents, charting Singapore’s independent path. Interlinked imperatives of stability and growth offered increasing ballast, especially as Malaysia became more foil than sibling. And yet as Singapore’s regime became far more hegemonic than Malaysia’s, it came to rest—after a more technocratic approach proved infirming—on similar pillars of partisanized policies, party machines, and clientelistic linkages, fostering performance legitimacy and narrowing challengers’ options to facilitate long-term, minimally coercive maintenance of illiberal rule. Singapore throws into sharp relief the patterns seen in Malaysia, as opposition parties have had far less chance to make their mark. Not only has the PAP, like UMNO, changed over time, but it has changed Singapore’s political culture, including how voters understand politics, assess politicians, and approach the regime. That shift has nudged challengers toward a common model. As in Malaysia, they have adapted to terms of a game almost impossible to win, stunting conceptualization of a genuinely different regime. Hence, as in Malaysia, we see a shift over time from a politics of ideology and policy to one of cultivated dependency and parochial, short-term, instrumental assessments, fostering calculations that favor the dominant party Singapore throws into sharp relief the patterns seen in Malaysia, as opposition parties have had far less chance to make their mark. Not only has the PAP, like UMNO, changed over time, but it has changed ingapore’s political culture, including how voters understand politics, assess politicians, and approach the regime. That shift has nudged challengers toward a common model. As in Malaysia, they have adapted to terms of a ame almost impossible to win, stunting conceptualization of a genuinely different regime. Hence, as in Malaysia, we see a shift over time from a politics of ideology and policy to one of cultivated dependency and parochial, short-term, instrumental assessments, fostering calculations that favor the dominant part.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to bring out the possibility of selecting good leaders in Asian countries, i.e., China and Singapore. Design/methodology/approach: Since comparative historical analysis enhances the objectivity for academic discussion, Deng Xiaoping’s and Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership successions have been chosen as the cases for studies by virtue of “method of agreement”. Incorporating “argument based on the contrary” into the context for macro-historical analysis, this paper characterises the duo’s successful (at least quite successful) leadership successions, thus offering an alternative paradigm beyond Western-style democracy. Findings: Both cases of post-Mao China and the independent Singapore indicate that in quite a number of Asian countries, good leaders could still be selected beyond universal suffrage as practised among Western Electoral Democracies, mainly because of the elites-driven context. As to the duo’s succession results, Deng Xiaoping’s selection of leaders was somewhat successful, while Lee Kuan Yew’s was phenomenal. Originality: This paper offers readers a glance over the possibility of selecting good leaders in Asian countries not fully based on Western-style democracy. Learning from the duo’s leadership successions, the West may treat elite politics as the supplement under Western Electoral Democracies in order to avoid their countries falling into the trap of populism. The West could meanwhile consider the exceptional criteria prized by the duo for leadership successions. Considering such interactions among elites in the real-life context, it could serve as an alternative model to Western-style democracy.