Since its independence in 1965, Singapore has been trying to unify its diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities under one coherent national identity. Queer Singaporeans, however, suffer from a double alienation from the nation. While socially ostracised by the existing anti-sodomy Section 377A and the queer-unfriendly state policies that it justifies, they also suffer from that inability to identify with the nation called the 'Great Affective Divide'. In this essay, I aim to achieve two goals. Firstly, I invoke the idea of cultural citizenship as I ethnographically investigate the efforts that queer Singaporeans make to overcome their national estrangement, particularly an event called 'Pink Dot'. While such efforts do not receive universal support from queers, they are essential in the development of a better understanding of it means to be citizens of Singapore. Secondly, rather than wanting to remain socially marginal and critical of the norm, queers actually express their desire for national inclusion through Pink Dot. Yet, I argue that it would be erroneous to read this desire as 'homonationalism'. As such, Pink Dot provides a fertile example that counters the conventional view within Queer Studies that queers always resist the hetero-patriarchal norm.

This paper compares co-ethnic migrants in Japan and Singapore, namely: the Nikkeijin in Japan and Chinese nationals in Singapore. One striking difference between the two countries is that Singapore refers to migrants, both skilled and unskilled, as valuable human resources, while in Japan, the most influential discourse on migrants portrays them as an internal security threat. The Singaporean Government has made serious efforts in integrating skilled Chinese nationals, but in Japan, little has been done at the national level to integrate the Nikkeijin, even though they are potential long-term residents. Although the negative effects of having an ageing and declining population threaten both countries, Singapore has responded by prioritising immigration while Japan has not. Singapore may espouse multiculturalism, but the Singaporean Chinese have rejected Chinese nationals just the same. Singaporeans have rejected co-ethnic migrants primarily because they are outraged by the privileges offered to skilled Chinese nationals in employment, residency and citizenship matters. The Japanese, on the other hand, have rejected the Nikkeijin because despite their Japanese descent, they disturb Japanese homogeneity by bringing with them their language and culture from Latin America.

This research has three goals. First, it sets out to compare consumer acceptance of lab-grown meat in the U.S. and in Singapore. Second, it seeks to explain the difference in Americans' and Singaporeans' acceptance of lab-grown meat by examining their eating motivations. Specifically, we focused on social image motivations – the motivations to present oneself positively in social contexts. Third, this study also aims to assess if exposure to information about lab-grown meat communicated by celebrity versus expert social media influencers (SMIs) can impact people's acceptance of lab-grown meat products. Our analysis showed that Singaporean participants had greater acceptance of lab-grown meat compared to their American counterparts, and this cultural difference was explained by Singaporeans' stronger social image eating motivations. In other words, cross-country differences in motivation to eat for a favorable social image can explain differences in consumer acceptance of lab-grown meat. The Singaporean cultural trait of kiasuism, which is exemplified by the fear of losing out or being left behind, may explain Singaporeans' motivation to project an image of being ‘trailblazers’ (vis-a-vis other nationalities) by expressing a higher acceptance of novel foods such as lab-grown meat. Results also revealed that the information about lab-grown meat being communicated by a celebrity or an expert SMI did not make a difference in participants' acceptance of lab-grown meat in both countries. Together, this research suggests an interesting implication that novel food industries and marketers can promote product branding by boosting media coverage (including online social media) of their lab-grown products' ‘firsts’ (e.g., the first production line in the world, the first technological breakthrough), especially in markets with high social image concerns. © 2022 Elsevier Ltd